Clarifying Standards for Compelled Commercial Speech by Berman, Micah L.
Washington University Journal of Law & Policy 
Volume 50 Toward a Healthy First Amendment 
2016 
Clarifying Standards for Compelled Commercial Speech 
Micah L. Berman 
The Ohio State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons, Health Law and Policy 
Commons, and the Medical Jurisprudence Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Micah L. Berman, Clarifying Standards for Compelled Commercial Speech, 50 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 053 
(2016), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol50/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Journal of Law & Policy by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
53 
Clarifying Standards for Compelled Commercial 
Speech 
Micah L. Berman 
INTRODUCTION 
San Francisco recently became the first community in the country 
to require advertisements for sugar-sweetened beverages to include a 
health warning. The warning, which must cover at least 20 percent of 
the advertising space, reads: “WARNING: Drinking beverages with 
added sugar(s) contributes to obesity, diabetes and tooth decay. This 
is a message from the City and County of San Francisco.”1 
Separately, state legislatures in California and New York are 
currently considering laws that would require similar warnings to be 
placed on all bottles and cans of sugar-sweetened beverages.
2
  
The American Beverage Association has already challenged San 
Francisco’s law in federal court, claiming that it “violates private 
speakers’ constitutional right to decide for themselves what to say, 
and what not to say.”3 Undoubtedly, if a state law requiring warnings 
on cans and bottles is passed into law, such a law will be challenged 
on First Amendment grounds as well. 
The two sides of this legal dispute could not be further apart. 
Advocates supporting the warnings claim that they will convey 
important health-related information to the public and raise no 
substantial First Amendment concerns. By contrast, opponents argue 
that the warnings are subject to “strict scrutiny”—the highest level of 
 
 
 Assistant Professor of Public Health and Law, The Ohio State University. Thanks to 
Liz Sepper for organizing this symposium issue, and to Ted Mermin for his helpful suggestions. 
 1. Sugar-Sweetened Beverage Warning Ordinance, S.F., Cal., Ordinance 100-15 (2015). 
 2. Ponice Rutsch, Is It Time for a Warning Label on Sugar-Loaded Drinks?, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2015/04/09/398526965/is-it-time-
for-a-warning-label-on-sugar-loaded-drinks.  
 3. Complaint, Am. Beverage Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco (N.D. Cal. 2015) 
(No. 3:15-cv-03415) [hereinafter ABA Complaint]. 
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constitutional review—and fail that standard because they are 
misleading, ineffective, and reflect only the city’s “opinion.”4 
This dispute is just one example of recent legal clashes between 
public health and commercial advertising interests, which have 
increasingly centered on the doctrine of compelled commercial 
speech.
5
 In recent years, the Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
doctrine has gradually made it ever more difficult to impose 
restrictions on commercial advertising.
6
 As a result, public health 
advocates have instead looked to warning requirements and mandated 
disclosures as potentially more legally viable methods of combatting 
the negative health consequences of unrestrained advertising.
7
  
Despite the widespread use of mandated warnings as a public 
health tool, legal doctrine—and legal scholarship—in this area 
remains remarkably underdeveloped. While the Supreme Court has 
addressed the constitutionality of “compelled speech” requirements 
on a few occasions, it has never done so in the context of health-
related warnings or disclosures.
8
 Thus, this area of law is rife with 
circuit splits, ambiguous opinions, and unanswered questions that 
make it difficult to issue any clear statements about black letter law.  
 
 4. Under strict scrutiny, government regulations “are generally unconstitutional unless 
they are narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest.” Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 
U.S. 622, 680 (1994). 
 5. See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 361–65 
(2d ed. 2008) (explaining compelled commercial speech doctrine and discussing intersection 
with public health). 
 6. See Samantha Rauer, When the First Amendment and Public Health Collide: The 
Court's Increasingly Strict Constitutional Scrutiny of Health Regulations That Restrict 
Commercial Speech, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 690, 702 (2012) (concluding that the Supreme Court 
“essentially appears to apply strict scrutiny to public health regulations” that restrict 
commercial speech); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011) (applying 
“heightened judicial scrutiny” to state law restricting marketing of pharmaceuticals). 
 7. See, e.g., Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Compelled Speech Under the Commercial Speech 
Doctrine: The Case of Menu Label Laws, 12 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 159, 193 (2009) 
(arguing for use of compelled disclosures as a public health tool, and predicting that “[e]ven if 
the Supreme Court continues to interpret the First Amendment's protection for commercial 
speech more broadly, it could not, consistent with any First Amendment jurisprudence, disrupt 
the ability of the government to require commercial entities from disclosing factual information 
about their products and services”). 
 8. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 
(1985); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1 (1986); Milavetz, 
Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010). 
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This Article identifies and analyzes unsettled areas in compelled 
commercial speech doctrine, especially those critical to identifying 
the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied to mandated warnings 
and disclosures. Looking back to the original purpose of the 
commercial speech doctrine, this article suggests that communities 
should have considerable flexibility to mandate warnings geared 
towards protecting the public’s health. Mandated warnings may not 
always be the most effective policy option, but as a matter of First 
Amendment doctrine, communities should be given broad leeway to 
decide whether and how to use warnings in order to better inform the 
public about potential dangers.  
Part I provides the factual and legal background necessary to 
explore this issue. After briefly discussing the use of mandated 
warnings and disclosures as public health tools, it reviews the 
Zauderer test, which is the prevailing standard for analyzing 
compelled commercial speech under the First Amendment. It then 
reviews the 2012 D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals opinion striking 
down graphic health warnings for cigarette packs and advertisements, 
which exemplifies the courts’ increasingly aggressive review of 
compelled commercial speech requirements. Part II identifies some 
of the core doctrinal questions in need of clarification. It also 
considers how these questions might best be resolved, keeping in 
mind the government’s interest in promoting and protecting public 
health. Finally, Part III concludes the Article by returning to a brief 
discussion of the San Francisco warnings for sugar-sweetened 
beverage advertisements.  
I. BACKGROUND OF THE COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
DOCTRINE 
A. Compelled Speech as a Public Health Tool 
“Compelled commercial speech” refers to requirements for 
commercial entities to include government-mandated messaging in 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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their advertising, on their products, or elsewhere.
9
 As a public health 
tool, compelled speech has a mixed record at best. The current 
warning labels on cigarettes, for example, are widely understood to 
be ineffective because their size and placement makes them 
“inadequate to attract attention,” and their content is not “persuasive[] 
and memorable.”10 To the contrary, the warning requirement has 
arguably harmed public health by insulating tobacco companies from 
litigation.
11
 Similarly, there is little evidence that the current warning 
labels on alcohol have any significant impact on consumer decision-
making.
12
 
The evidence regarding the effectiveness of calorie disclosures—
which will soon be coming to chain restaurants nationwide—is also 
equivocal.
13
 Both experimental and observational studies suggest that 
calorie-posting requirements may be ineffective or may have at 
modest impact at best.
14
 New York City, for instance, has required 
calorie postings since 2008. Yet a study tracking the behavior of 
adolescents before and after the law went into effect concluded that 
they “did not respond in any measurable way to the presence of 
 
 9. See Ellen P. Goodman, Visual Gut Punch: Persuasion, Emotion, and the 
Constitutional Meaning of Graphic Disclosure, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 513, 515 (2014) 
(providing examples of compelled commercial speech). 
 10. INST. OF MED., GROWING UP TOBACCO FREE: PREVENTING NICOTINE ADDICTION IN 
CHILDREN AND YOUTHS 234–44 (Barbara S. Lynch & Richard J. Bonnie eds, National 
Academy Press 1994). 
 11. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524–25 (1992) (ruling that 
“failure to warn” tort claims were preempted by the federal cigarette labeling requirement).  
 12. See David P. MacKinnon et al., The Alcohol Warning and Adolescents: 5-Year 
Effects, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1589, 1589 (2000) (concluding that “[t]he alcohol warning has 
not affected adolescents’ beliefs about alcohol or alcohol-related behaviors”); TIM STOCKWELL, 
CENTRE FOR ADDICTIONS RESEARCH OF BC, A REVIEW OF RESEARCH INTO THE IMPACTS OF 
ALCOHOL WARNING LABELS ON ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR 4–7 (2006) (summarizing that 
although warnings may have led to “greater awareness of the messages they contained,” studies 
of their impact have been nearly unanimous in their conclusion that the “impacts on drinking 
behaviour are either nonexistent or minimal”).  
 13. Marion Nestle, Health Care Reform in Action—Calorie Labeling Goes National, 362 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2343, 2344 (2010) (suggesting that while there is “potential value is posting 
calorie counts,” the evidence to date is “not easily interpreted”). 
 14. Jacqueline I. Aron et al., Paradoxical Effect of a Nutrition Labeling Scheme in a 
Student Cafeteria, 15 NUTRITION RES. 1251 (1995); Lisa J. Harnack et al., Effects of Calorie 
Labeling and Value Size Pricing on Fast Food Meal Choices: Results from an Experimental 
Trial 5 INT’L J. BEHAV. NUTRITION & PHYSICAL ACTIVITY 63, 64–65 (2008); Brian Elbel et 
al., Calorie Labeling and Food Choices: A First Look at the Effects on Low-Income People in 
New York City, 28 HEALTH AFFAIRS w1110 (2009). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol50/iss1/3
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labels . . . .”15 Some experts have argued that calorie labeling will 
pressure restaurants to reformulate their foods, which could produce 
public health gains, but the evidence underlying this assertion is 
inconclusive thus far.
16
  
The upshot of such evidence is not that all warnings are 
ineffective; for instance, there is compelling evidence that 
sufficiently large graphic warnings on cigarette packs can 
meaningfully promote smoking cessation.
17
 Rather, the point is that 
the provision of information should not be assumed to have a direct 
and straightforward effect on consumer behavior. Among other 
complicating factors, individuals with low literacy levels may not 
understand the information presented,
18
 advertising and other forms 
of promotion (e.g., price discounts) may counteract the impact of 
mandated disclosures,
19
 and warnings may trigger psychological 
defense mechanisms that produce the opposite of the intended 
result.
20
 Changing behavior is an exceedingly difficult endeavor, and 
“[i]t turns out that the simple act of conveying information to an 
individual seldom suffices to change that individual's behavior.”21 
Moreover, almost by definition, mandated disclosures put the onus 
for behavioral change on the individual receiving the message, 
 
 15. B. Elbel et al., Child and Adolescent Fast-Food Choice and the Influence of Calorie 
Labeling: A Natural Experiment, 35 INT’L J. OBESITY 493, 493 (2011).  
 16. Nestle, supra note 13, at 2344–45.  
 17. See, e.g., David Hammond, Health Warning Messages on Tobacco Products: A 
Review, 20 TOBACCO CONTROL 327, 327 (2011) (concluding that “whereas obscure text-only 
warnings appear to have little impact, prominent health warnings on the face of packages serve 
as a prominent source of health information for smokers and non-smokers, can increase health 
knowledge and perceptions of risk and can promote smoking cessation”). 
 18. See, e.g., Terry C. Davis et al., Low Literacy Impairs Comprehension of Prescription 
Drug Warning Labels, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 847, 850 (2006) (finding that many patients 
with low literacy skills had trouble interpreting warnings written at a first grade reading level).  
 19. See, e.g., Leslie B. Snyder & Deborah J. Blood, Caution: Alcohol Advertising and the 
Surgeon General's Alcohol Warnings May Have Adverse Effects on Young Adults, 20 J. 
APPLIED COMM. RES. 37, 37 (1992) (finding that alcohol advertisements “reduc[ed] people's 
ability to recall the content of the warning[s]”). 
 20. See, e.g., Debra Jones Ringold, Boomerang Effects in Response to Public Health 
Interventions: Some Unintended Consequences in the Alcoholic Beverage Market, 25 J. 
CONSUMER POL’Y 27, 27 (2002) (discussing the psychological theory of “reactance,” which 
suggests that consumers can be “aroused in opposition to perceived threats to personal choice,” 
rendering warnings ineffective or counterproductive).  
 21. Wendy E. Parmet & Jason A. Smith, Free Speech and Public Health: A Population-
Based Approach to the First Amendment, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 363, 377 (2006). 
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ignoring the population-level social, economic, cultural, and 
environmental forces that may influence or promote unhealthy 
behaviors.
22
 Public health advocates should therefore promote the use 
of mandated disclosures only as part of a package of policy measures 
that takes these contextual factors into account.  
Accordingly, as matter of good public health practice, warning 
requirements should not be assumed to promote public health: 
rigorous research, testing, and evaluation is required. Whether laws 
mandating warnings should be subjected to rigorous scrutiny as a 
matter of First Amendment doctrine, however, is a separate question. 
B. The First Amendment Standard: Zauderer 
The foundational Supreme Court case on compelled commercial 
disclosures is Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the 
Supreme Court of Ohio.
23
 In this 1985 opinion upholding a required 
disclosure on attorney advertisements, the Court clearly distinguished 
compelled commercial speech from compelled non-commercial 
speech.
24
 Although the Court had stated in the non-commercial 
context that that “the right of freedom of thought protected by the 
First Amendment . . . includes both the right to speak freely and the 
right to refrain from speaking at all,”25 Zauderer clarified that this 
maxim is inapplicable in the context of commercial advertisements.
26
 
 
 22. As noted above, however, disclosure requirements may also pressure companies to 
change their conduct in order to avoid embarrassment. Starbucks, for example, introduced its 
low-calorie “Vivanno” line of products shortly after New York City’s calorie labeling law went 
into effect, presumably in response to the disclosure requirement. Samantha K. Graff et al., 
Policies for Healthier Communities: Historical, Legal, and Practical Elements of the Obesity 
Movement, 33 ANN. REV. PUBLIC HEALTH 307, 315 (2012). 
 23. 471 U.S. 626 (1985). 
 24. The state’s rule required attorney advertisements mentioning contingency fees to 
“inform clients that they would be liable for costs (as opposed to legal fees) even if their claims 
were unsuccessful.” Id. at 633.  
 25. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (holding that New Hampshire could 
not compel citizens to display the state’s “Live Free or Die” motto their on license plates over 
their objections). 
 26. Zauderer, 417 U.S. at 651 (“[T]he interests at stake in this case are not of the same 
order as those discussed in [compelled political and ideological speech cases]. Ohio has not 
attempted to ‘prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters 
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.’ The State has 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol50/iss1/3
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It explained: 
Because the extension of First Amendment protection to 
commercial speech is justified principally by the value to 
consumers of the information such speech provides, 
appellant's constitutionally protected interest in not providing 
any particular factual information in his advertising is 
minimal. . . . [B]ecause disclosure requirements trench much 
more narrowly on an advertiser's interests than do flat 
prohibitions on speech, “warning[s] or disclaimer[s] might be 
appropriately required . . . in order to dissipate the possibility 
of consumer confusion or deception.”27 
The relaxed standard called for in Zauderer is generally viewed as 
being akin to a rational basis standard.
28
 So long as the government 
can establish that the proposed disclaimer or warning is “factual and 
uncontroversial”—an issue discussed later—a relaxed standard of 
review applies. For instance, in upholding New York City’s calorie 
labeling requirement, the Second Circuit found that the “calorie 
disclosure rules were clearly reasonably related to [the regulation’s] 
goal of reducing obesity.”29 Without reviewing the scientific 
literature on the effectiveness of calorie labeling, the court found it 
sufficient that (1) obesity is significant public health concern, driven 
in large part by out-of-home consumption; and (2) providing calorie 
information in restaurants might help to better inform consumer 
decision-making. This conclusion accurately reflects the general 
principle that under rational basis review, government actions “may 
be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or 
empirical data,” and the party challenging the requirement must 
“negate every conceivable basis that might support it.”30 
 
attempted only to prescribe what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising. . . .”) (alteration 
in original) (citations omitted). 
 27. Id. at 651 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 28. N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 132 (2d Cir. 2009); 
CTIA-The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 2015 WL 5569072, at *11 (N.D. Cal., Sept. 21, 
2015) (“[C]ircuit courts have essentially characterized the Zauderer test as a rational basis or 
rational review test.”). 
 29. N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n, 556 F.3d at 136 (emphasis added). 
 30. FCC v. Beach Comm., Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993). 
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Although some businesses groups are attempting to blur the line 
between commercial and non-commercial compelled speech, at the 
moment there is still broad agreement that the “Zauderer test” applies 
to compelled commercial disclosures.
31
 Far less clear, however, are 
(1) what counts as a “factual and uncontroversial” warning 
requirement, subject to the Zauderer test; and (2) what doctrinal test 
applies if Zauderer does not. These were the key questions addressed 
by the D.C. Circuit in its review of the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration’s (FDA) proposed graphic warnings for cigarette 
packages and advertisements, widely seen as one of the most 
important recent cases involving compelled commercial speech.
32
  
C. Cigarette Warning Labels: R.J. Reynolds v. FDA 
In R.J. Reynolds, the D.C. Circuit, by a 2-1 margin, struck down 
the FDA’s proposed graphic warnings for cigarettes on First 
Amendment grounds.
33
 Numerous law review articles have 
summarized the facts of the case and both praised and criticized the 
decision.
34
 For the purposes of this article, this decision is important 
because it (1) exemplifies the trends of courts applying heightened 
scrutiny to laws involving compelled commercial speech, in contrast 
to the more cursory review outlined in Zauderer; and (2) highlights 
 
 31. Stephen D. Sugarman, Compelling Product Sellers to Transmit Government Public 
Health Messages, 29 J.L. & POL. 557, 560 (2014) (“Tobacco companies [and] business interests 
in general . . . argue that requiring gas stations, grocery stores, and gun companies to post 
[governmentally compelled] messages is unconstitutional because it violates the free speech 
rights of these businesses. They argue that such requirements are legally the same thing as 
requiring school children to stand up, put their hand over their heart or put their fingers to their 
forehead in a salute, and say the pledge of allegiance to the flag.”). 
 32. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012), overruled in part 
by Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 33. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d 1205.  
 34. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 9, at 516–17 (describing the “[t]wo opposing 
narratives” of the case; the public health narrative that the cigarette warning labels “merely 
update textual labels that have been in place for a half-century, providing consumers with full 
information about the risks of smoking,” and the industry’s narrative that “graphic labels 
convert government from objective informer to ideological persuader, shouting its warning in 
order to manipulate consumer decisions”); Allen Rostron, Pragmatism, Paternalism, and the 
Constitutional Protection of Commercial Speech, 37 VT. L. REV. 527, 563–74 (2013); Nadia N. 
Sawicki, Compelling Images: The Constitutionality of Emotionally Persuasive Health 
Campaigns, 73 MD. L. REV. 458 (2014).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol50/iss1/3
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some of the important unsettled doctrinal questions relating to 
compelled commercial speech. 
1. Applicability of Zauderer 
The court began by acknowledging that “factual and 
uncontroversial” required disclosures are subject to the Zauderer 
standard, which is “akin to rational basis review.”35 But it then 
concluded that Zauderer was not the appropriate standard to apply 
the cigarette graphic warning labels for two reasons.  
First, it suggested that the Zauderer standard was limited to cases 
where the “government affirmatively demonstrates that an 
advertisement threatens to deceive consumers.”36 Despite a long 
history of misleading (and false) tobacco advertisements, the court 
concluded that because the 2009 Tobacco Control Act now prohibits 
unverified health claims and the use of misleading terms in tobacco 
advertisements, the government could no longer demonstrate that 
future tobacco advertisements were likely to deceive consumers.
37
 As 
discussed further below, this portion of the D.C. Circuit’s opinion 
was later overruled by an en banc panel in American Meat Institute v. 
USDA.
38
  
Second, the D.C. Circuit questioned whether the graphic warnings 
were the type of “purely factual and uncontroversial” disclosure to 
which the Zauderer standard applies.
39
 Other than a related Sixth 
Circuit case,
40
 R.J. Reynolds was the first case to directly consider 
whether required disclosures of images raised different issues than 
compelled disclosure of text.
41
 The D.C. Circuit, while 
 
 35. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1212. 
 36. Id. at 1214. 
 37. Id. at 1216 (concluding that Zauderer did not apply because “[t]he warnings . . . 
represent an ongoing effort to discourage consumers from buying the Companies' products, 
rather than . . . a measure designed to combat specific deceptive claims”). 
 38. Am. Meat Inst. v. USDA, 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
 39. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216. 
 40. Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(rejecting a facial challenge to the cigarette graphic warning requirement). 
 41. New York City recently began requiring an image of a salt shaker to be placed next to 
menu items with high sodium content. The National Restaurant Association has threatened a 
lawsuit to challenge the rule, which applies to chain restaurants. This may provide the courts 
with another opportunity to consider the constitutional status of mandated images (in this case, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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acknowledging that none of the images were “patently false,” wrote 
that the images were “not ‘purely’ factual because . . . they are 
primarily intended to evoke an emotional response.”42 Judge Janice 
Rogers Brown, writing for the majority, concluded: “These 
inflammatory images . . . cannot rationally be viewed as pure 
attempts to convey information to consumers. They are unabashed 
attempts to evoke emotion (and perhaps embarrassment) and 
browbeat consumers into quitting.”43 In short, Judge Rogers Brown 
equated “factual and uncontroversial” communications with “pure 
attempts to convey information.” But what are “pure attempts to 
convey information”? The phrase presumably refers to one (or both) 
of the following distinctions: (1) text-only, factual disclosures are 
“pure”, while pictorial images are, at least potentially, 
“inflammatory” and therefore non-factual; and/or (2) the 
straightforward, nonjudgmental conveyance of factual information is 
“pure,” while efforts to influence consumer behavior are not. Thus, 
the opinion suggests that the D.C. Circuit would require the 
government to limit compelled disclosures to “just the facts,” 
presented in black and white, if Zauderer is to apply.  
2. Standard of Review if Zauderer is Inapplicable 
A subsidiary question raised by R.J. Reynolds is what the 
appropriate standard of review should be if a court concludes that a 
required warning or disclaimer is not “factual and uncontroversial” as 
required by Zauderer. Previously, courts had found most warnings to 
either satisfy Zauderer or fail under any conceivable standard; 
therefore this question was also without a clear answer.  
The plaintiff tobacco companies asserted that if Zauderer did not 
apply, strict scrutiny was the appropriate backup standard. In 
contrast, the government argued that if the court found Zauderer to 
be inapplicable, the warnings would alternatively survive scrutiny 
 
a simple illustration, rather than graphic images). Daniel Victor, High-Salt Warnings on New 
York Menus to Start Tuesday, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/01/ 
nyregion/salt-warnings-new-york-restaurants.html?_r=0.  
 42. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216–17. 
 43. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol50/iss1/3
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under the Central Hudson test, implicitly suggesting that this was the 
correct backup standard.
44
 
After concluding that Zauderer was inapplicable, the D.C. Circuit 
chose to apply the Central Hudson test, which is an intermediate 
scrutiny standard normally applied to restrictions on commercial 
speech.
45
 This test consists of four prongs: 
1. To qualify for First Amendment protection, the 
commercial speech must concern lawful activity and not 
be misleading.  
2. The government’s asserted interest in restricting the 
speech must be substantial. 
3. The restriction must directly advance the government’s 
asserted interest. 
4. The restriction must not be more extensive than necessary 
to serve the asserted government interest.
46
 
These requirements were designed to test restrictions on commercial 
speech, and it should be readily apparent that these four prongs are 
not easily applicable to mandated disclosures. As there is no speech 
being restricted in this type of case, the first prong appears to be 
inapplicable, and the D.C. Circuit did not even mention it. Likewise, 
it is hard to apply the fourth prong to a compelled disclosure. What 
would it mean for a warning to be “more extensive than necessary”?47 
Making the (reasonable) assumption that larger and stronger 
warnings are generally more effective than a smaller and weaker 
 
 44. Id. at 1217. 
 45. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
The D.C. Circuit applied Central Hudson rather than strict scrutiny in part because it felt bound 
by the Circuit’s prior decision in United States v. Philip Morris, 566 F.3d 1095, 1142–45. (D.C. 
Cir. 2009) (reviewing the constitutionality of requiring cigarette companies to publish 
“corrective statements”).  
 46. Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
 47. See Nat Stern, Graphic Labels, Dire Warnings, and the Facile Assumption of Factual 
Content in Compelled Commercial Speech, 29 J.L. & POL. 577, 584 (2014) (“The requirement 
that a restriction not be ‘more extensive than is necessary to serve [the state's] interest’ . . . has 
no direct counterpart in the government's injection of nonfactual speech into an advertiser's 
message.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 50:53 
 
 
ones, how is a court supposed to determine what is “too much” 
warning?  
Since there is no clear way in which the Central Hudson test can 
be applied to compelled speech cases, the courts are left with a free-
floating, standardless means/ends test. In R.J. Reynolds, the court 
concluded that the FDA had failed prong two of Central Hudson 
because it had not provided a “shred of evidence . . . showing that the 
graphic warnings will ‘directly advance’ its interest in reducing the 
number of Americans who smoke.”48 This conclusion was belied by 
the evidence presented in the case and has been appropriately 
criticized elsewhere.
49
 Indeed, the conclusion is quite ironic (or 
troubling, from a public health perspective), because graphic health 
warnings for tobacco are one of the few types of required warnings 
for which there is a well-developed body of supportive evidence. For 
purposes of this article, though, it is sufficient to note that application 
of this modified Central Hudson test allowed the Court of Appeals to 
engage in essentially unrestrained second-guessing of the FDA’s 
scientific conclusions.
50
  
The FDA did not appeal the R.J. Reynolds decision to the 
Supreme Court, instead electing to develop new warning labels that 
would be more likely to survive legal review.
51
 It has now been more 
 
 48. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1219. 
 49. See, e.g., Wendy E. Parmet & Peter D. Jacobson, The Courts and Public Health: 
Caught in a Pincer Movement, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 392, 394–95 (2014) (“The majority’s 
disdain for the FDA’s evidence shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the science behind 
epidemiology.”). 
 50. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Should Food Businesses Be Able to Use the First 
Amendment to Resist Providing Consumers with Government-Mandated Public Health 
Messages?, 5:4 FOOD & DRUG L. POL’Y FORUM 7 (2015) (writing that the use of Central 
Hudson in compelled speech cases “turns courts into the equivalent of the Office of Information 
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)—the office within the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) that applies tough cost-benefit analysis to regulations proposed by federal agencies,” 
and that judicial review of this sort is “an invitation to a return to the Lochner era”). 
 51. Letter from Hon. Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General, to Hon. John Boehner, 
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.mainjustice.com/ 
files/2013/03/Ltr-to-Speaker-re-Reynolds-v-FDA.pdf (stating that the FDA had decided not to 
appeal the decision because it can “address issues identified by the court of appeals” in a new 
rulemaking process, and it would have another opportunity to seek Supreme Court review if 
revised graphic warnings were later struck down). This decision was perhaps “a strategic step to 
avoid a Supreme Court that has aggressively protected corporate speech.” Nathan Cortez, Do 
Graphic Tobacco Warnings Violate the First Amendment, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1467, 1470 (2013). 
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than three years since the D.C. Circuit’s opinion, and the FDA has 
yet to propose new warnings. This may be in part because the 
decision in R.J. Reynolds v. FDA raises far more questions than it 
answers. The opinion, including the court’s confusing application of 
both the Zauderer test and the Central Hudson test, highlighted how 
many doctrinal questions in the area of compelled commercial speech 
remain unresolved. 
II. OPEN QUESTIONS IN COMPELLED COMMERCIAL SPEECH 
DOCTRINE 
This part introduces four critical doctrinal questions relating to 
compelled commercial speech that remain unresolved or unaddressed 
following the R.J. Reynolds decision and other recent federal court 
opinions. As government policymakers and public health advocates 
consider what innovative policies could help protect and promote the 
public’s health, there is a critical need for additional legal and 
interdisciplinary scholarship that could explore the potential 
implications of resolving these doctrinal disputes in different ways. 
This section is intended to lay the groundwork for such future 
research by identifying some of the critical open questions and 
suggesting how, in my view, they could best be resolved in a manner 
that is consistent with both the Supreme Court’s doctrinal 
foundations and the interests of public health.  
A. What Is “Factual and Uncontroversial”? 
What types of warnings/disclaimers are “factual and 
uncontroversial” such that they are reviewed under Zauderer’s 
relaxed standard? This is perhaps the most critical question under the 
Zauderer test. Although courts seem flummoxed by this question, in 
my view the answer is—or at least should be—rather straightforward: 
the “factual and uncontroversial” limitation is best read as a check to 
ensure that any mandated statement is factually accurate (or factually 
uncontroversial).  
This understanding follows from the historical and doctrinal 
underpinnings of Zauderer and the commercial speech doctrine as a 
whole. The commercial speech doctrine dates back only to the mid-
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1970s; before that time the Supreme Court did not consider 
commercial speech to be protected by the First Amendment at all.
52
  
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council Inc. (Virginia Pharmacy), the Supreme Court 
changed course and decided that the First Amendment’s protections 
extended to commercial speech.
53
 The reasoning focused squarely on 
the protection of consumer interests: commercial speech was 
deserving of constitutional protection because of its ability to 
communicate useful information to consumers and to help them make 
more informed choices.
54
 As Justice Stewart wrote in concurrence, 
“the one facet of commercial price and product advertising that 
warrants First Amendment protection . . . [is] its contribution to the 
flow of accurate and reliable information relevant to public and 
private decisionmaking.”55  
Zauderer based its reasoning on Virginia Pharmacy’s logic. 
Because commercial speech is constitutionally protected only to the 
extent it conveys “accurate and reliable” information to consumers, 
the Zauderer Court reasoned that an advertiser’s “constitutionally 
protected interest in not providing any particular factual information 
in his advertising is minimal.”56 A disclaimer that helps inform 
consumers or counter potentially misleading advertising may impose 
some burdens on the advertiser, but it furthers the goals of the 
commercial speech doctrine. Such disclaimers however, must be 
factually accurate (and non-misleading) in order to serve a valid 
governmental purpose.
57
 Understood in its proper context, the 
 
 52. See Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942) (“We are equally clear that the 
Constitution imposes no . . . restraint on government as respects purely commercial 
advertising.”). 
 53. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 
(1967); Micah L. Berman, Manipulative Marketing and the First Amendment, 103 GEO. L.J. 
497, 503 (2015). 
 54. See Berman, supra note 53, at 503–04 (2015). 
 55. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 781 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
 56. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 
651 (1985) (emphasis omitted). 
 57. While there is no agreed-upon meaning of the term “factually accurate,” it may be 
instructive to note that the Affordable Care Act defined “medically accurate” to mean “verified 
or supported by the weight of research conducted in compliance with accepted scientific 
methods and (A) published in peer-reviewed journals, where applicable; or (B) comprising 
information that leading professional organizations and agencies with relevant expertise in the 
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“factual and uncontroversial” limitation is thus focused only on 
whether the disclaimer provides factual information that will help to 
inform consumers. 
1. What Is “Factual”? 
R.J. Reynolds read the requirement that mandated disclosures be 
“factual” narrowly, suggesting that images are inherently less factual 
than text-only disclosures and that disclosures that “persuade” are 
less factual that those that merely “inform.” In my view, both of these 
distinctions are neither doctrinally nor logically sustainable. That an 
image provokes emotion or is compelling to viewers does not render 
it non-factual. As the Supreme Court explained in Zauderer (in a 
separate section of the opinion), “The use of illustrations or pictures 
. . . serves important communicative functions: it attracts the attention 
of the audience . . . and it may also serve to impart information 
directly.”58 Again focusing on the underlying purpose of the 
commercial speech doctrine, it is clear that pictures can be an 
extremely effective method of communicating accurate information, 
particularly to low-literacy and non-English-speaking audiences.
59
 
Likewise, even textual warnings, such as those indicating that a 
product can cause cancer or birth defects, trigger emotional 
 
field recognize as accurate . . . .”  42 U.S.C.A. § 713 (2015). Importantly, for information to be 
considered “factually accurate,” there does not need to be complete scientific consensus, as 
many well-established facts are contested by a small number of dissenters.  See, e.g., Beau 
Dure, Flat-Earthers Are Back: ‘It’s Almost Like the Beginning of a New Religion,’ THE 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/ science/2016/jan/20/flat-earth-
believers-youtube-videos-conspiracy-theorists. 
 58. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 647. 
 59. See David Hammond, Tobacco Packaging and Labeling Policies Under the U.S. 
Tobacco Control Act: Research Needs and Priorities, 14 NICOTINE & TOBACCO RES. 62, 64–65 
(2012) (“Pictorial warnings may be particularly important in communicating health information 
to populations with lower literacy rates. This is particularly important considering that, in 
countries such as the United States, smokers have lower levels of education than the general 
population.” (citation omitted)). 
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responses.
60
 “Emotional” (or “persuasive”) is not the opposite of 
“factual.”61  
It is also important to point out that the D.C. Circuit’s opinion 
would make it exceedingly difficult for the government to mandate 
effective warnings or disclaimers.
62
 Text-only warnings simply do not 
stand a chance when pitted against sophisticated companies’ use of 
advertising techniques that rely on non-informational, image-driven, 
emotional appeals.
63
 This dynamic likely explains the ineffectiveness 
of the cigarette and alcohol warnings discussed in Part I. In order to 
effectively break through the clutter of the extensive advertising to 
which consumers are exposed on a daily basis, pictorial images may 
be required in some circumstances.
64
  
Likewise, nothing in Zauderer suggests that warnings cannot be 
designed to influence consumer behavior—or that such warnings fail 
the “factual” requirement. There may be cases where simply 
informing a consumer is sufficient—and Zauderer was likely one of 
them. In Zauderer, the government required attorneys to inform 
potential clients of the costs they might incur if they hired an attorney 
on a contingency-fee basis.
65
 Once fully informed of those costs, 
whether a prospective client chose to respond to an attorney’s 
 
 60. See Rebecca Tushnet, More than a Feeling: Emotion and the First Amendment, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 2392, 2407 (2014) (“Under the majority’s reasoning [in R.J. Reynolds], the 
government is apparently not allowed to mandate a warning that works through an emotional 
mechanism. One immediate problem with that conclusion is that ‘purely’ factual words also 
work that way.”). 
 61. See Cortez, supra note 51, at 1486 (“Just because the images may be discomforting or 
even disturbing to look at does not make them factually inaccurate.”); Disc. Tobacco City & 
Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 569 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Facts can disconcert, 
displease, provoke and emotional response, spark controversy, and even overwhelm reason, but 
that does not magically turn such facts into opinions.”). 
 62. Cortez, supra note 51, at 1499 (suggesting that First Amendment doctrine should 
facilitate the use of “disclosure methods that actually work—meaning they are actually seen and 
digested rather than ignored”). 
 63. Berman, supra note 53, at 535; Goodman, supra note 9, at 567 (“An understanding of 
factual that insists on single provable assertions and that is hostile to the use of complex 
emotional-cognitive pathways will leave little room for more effective forms of 
communication.”). 
 64. This is why at least sixty countries around the world now required graphic cigarette 
warning labels that cover at least 50 percent of the package’s front and back. CANADIAN 
CANCER SOC’Y, CIGARETTE PACKAGE HEALTH WARNINGS 8–9 (4th ed. 2014).  
 65. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 
652 (1985). 
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solicitation was of no concern to the government; rather, the 
government’s interest was fully satisfied when the relevant facts were 
disclosed. But when the governmental interest involved is public 
health (and what is being mandated is a warning, rather than a 
disclosure), the government most clearly does have a stake in how a 
consumer responds to the warning. The D.C. Circuit in R.J. Reynolds 
appears to take the position that the government’s interest is satisfied 
so long as consumers are informed of the dangers of smoking; 
whether or not they choose to smoke given those dangers is none of 
the government’s business. In this respect, the D.C. Circuit adopted 
quite a radical position. If addressing the leading cause of preventable 
death is not the government’s business, it is not clear what would be. 
Why else would the government inform a consumer of the risks? As a 
matter of policy or ideology, one can reasonably take the position that 
the government should not use warnings to influence consumer 
behavior. But as a matter of First Amendment doctrine there is no 
such limitation, and the D.C. Circuit provided no case law 
demonstrating otherwise.  
Though the First Amendment does not prohibit the government 
from seeking to influence consumer behavior, Zauderer’s “factual” 
requirement does limit how the government can use required 
disclosures to do so. For example, a warning that states “WARNING: 
The Tobacco Industry is Not Your Friend” expresses an opinion, not 
an empirically verifiable fact, and should not be examined under 
Zauderer, but instead under a more stringent standard.
66
 Likewise, it 
is possible that some images (for example, an image of a smoker 
being shamed by his friends) may be best characterized as 
expressions of opinion rather than of fact. But the use of warnings, 
whether textual or pictorial, to influence consumer behavior does not, 
in and of itself, render them nonfactual. As Ellen Goodman writes, 
“the government often seeks simultaneously to inform and to 
influence consumer purchases by mandating product disclosures” 
 
 66. This mock “warning” was used as part of the State of California’s public education 
campaign. As the Ninth Circuit found, the government can express such an opinion when it is 
acting as the speaker. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Shewry, 423 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir. 2005). 
See discussion infra Part II.D. 
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such as “[n]utritional labels, toxic chemical disclosures, . . . cigarette 
warnings” and other familiar requirements.67  
2. What Is “Uncontroversial”? 
As explained above, “factual and uncontroversial” is best 
understood as a single requirement addressing the accuracy of the 
disclosure at issue.
68
 In recent cases, however, industry plaintiffs 
have tried to elevate “uncontroversial” to a separate and distinct 
requirement with a very different meaning. 
For instance, in an ongoing case, Grocery Manufacturers 
Association v. Sorrell, food manufacturers and retailers are 
challenging a Vermont law that requires food sold in the state to 
disclose whether it was produced in part through genetic 
engineering.
69
 Although the required disclosure is unquestionably 
factual, the plaintiffs argue that it is nonetheless “controversial” 
because it “requires manufacturers to convey an opinion with which 
they disagree . . . namely, that consumers should assign significance 
to the fact that a product contains an ingredient derived from a 
genetically engineered plant.”70 In other words, the disclosure is 
“controversial” and reflects an “opinion” because the manufacturers 
disagree about the need for a required disclosure. Of course, if this 
were the standard, every warning or disclosure that a manufacturer 
did not want to convey would be “controversial.”71 The District Court 
 
 67. Goodman, supra note 9, at 515; see also Jennifer M. Keighley, Can You Handle the 
Truth? Compelled Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539, 
569–72 (2012) (agreeing with this argument, but suggesting that the government crosses a line 
when it goes beyond factual statements and requires commercial actors to “express[] the 
government’s beliefs about how an individual should behave”).  
 68. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit suggested in Discount Tobacco that “uncontroversial” 
should not even be seen as a required attribute under Zauderer. In its view, the term “merely 
describes the disclosure the Court faced in that specific instance.” For Zauderer’s rational basis 
rule to apply, the Sixth Circuit said that disclosures must only be “factual” or “accurate.” Disc. 
Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 559 n.8 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 69. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-CV-117, 2015 WL 1931142 (D. Vt. Apr. 27, 
2015). 
 70. Id. at *26 (emphasis added) (quoting Complaint). 
 71. The same issue was raised in Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 
233 (2d Cir. 2014). The court struck down a required disclosure that would have made 
pregnancy services centers disclose whether or not they “provide or provide referrals for 
abortion.” Id. at 242. The court stated that the disclosure “requires centers to mention 
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succinctly rejected this argument, writing, “[a] factual disclosure does 
not reflect an opinion merely because it compels a speaker to convey 
information contrary to its interests.”72 
It is unlikely that courts would accept the strong form of the 
argument put forth by the plaintiffs in Grocery Manufacturers 
Association, which would render essentially all warnings and 
disclosures “controversial.” But courts might be more easily 
persuaded by a variant of this argument—that warnings implying the 
existence of dangers that have not been conclusively proven are 
“controversial.”  
CTIA-Wireless v. San Francisco, which addressed compelled 
disclosures relating to radio-frequency emission from cell phones, is 
an interesting example.
73
 In that case, San Francisco required point-
of-sale warnings at cell phone retail outlets that read:  
Cell phones emit radio-frequency energy. Studies continue to 
assess the potential health effects of mobile phone use. If you 
wish to reduce your exposure, the City of San Francisco 
recommends that you: 
 Keep distance between your phone and body 
 Use a headset, speakerphone, or text instead 
 Ask for a free factsheet with more tips.74 
The City noted that every statement in the required warning was 
entirely factual: cell phones indisputably do emit radiation, and 
 
controversial services that some pregnancy services centers, such as Plaintiffs in this case, 
oppose,” and was therefore “controversial.” Id. at 245 n.6. In the commercial speech context, it 
cannot be correct that a factual disclosure is “controversial” simply because the speaker would 
rather not be associated with it. It is not clear, however, that Evergreen should have been 
analyzed as a case involving commercial speech. Required disclosures for pregnancy services 
centers and/or abortion providers raise challenging First Amendment issues that are beyond the 
scope of this paper. Such cases also raise other constitutional issues, such as placing an undue 
burden on obtaining abortion services, that may impact the appropriate level of scrutiny. See 
Nadia N. Sawicki, Informed Consent as Compelled Professional Speech: Fictions, Facts, and 
Open Questions, 50 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11 (2016).  
 72. Sorrell, 2005 WL 1931142, at *32 (suggesting that a “controversial” requirement 
would be one that is “opinion-based,” as opposed to fact-based).  
 73. CTIA—The Wireless Ass'n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 827 F. Supp. 2d 1054 
(N.D. Cal. 2011), aff’d, 494 F. App’x 752 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 74. Id. at 1058.   
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studies are continuing to assess the related health effects. In its view, 
even if the science is unsettled, the precautionary principle justified 
the regulation; radio-frequency emissions might cause harm, and 
“better safe than sorry” was an appropriate warning message to 
communicate to the public.
75
  
The Ninth Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, found that the 
City’s warnings implicitly suggested that cell phone use is 
dangerous.
76
 Because “[t]here is a debate in the scientific community 
about the health effects of cell phones,” this was an expression of the 
City’s “opinion,” rather than an expression of fact.77 It is unclear 
whether the Ninth Circuit viewed the warning as being “non-factual,” 
“controversial,” or both. But in any event, the decision is troubling 
from a public health perspective.
78
  
Opponents of mandated warnings will nearly always be able to 
point to some scientific studies questioning the government’s 
position. Heated dispute over scientific truths is inherent in the nature 
of scientific inquiry, and, as the current “debate” over global 
warming demonstrates, there will always be critics and dissenters 
from the scientific consensus.
79
 But it cannot be the case that “the 
requirement that automobile manufacturers . . . affix a label to the 
fuel compartments of vehicles capable of operating on alternative 
fuels” is subjected to a higher level of scrutiny “because of public 
controversies about climate change.”80 Such a rule would force 
legislatures to wait for the chimera of “scientific certainty” before 
 
 75. Id. at 1058; Stephen G. Wood et al., Whither the Precautionary Principle? An 
American Assessment from an Administrative Law Perspective, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 581, 581 
(2006) (“The precautionary principle permits decisionmakers to avoid or minimize risks whose 
consequences are uncertain but potentially serious by taking anticipatory action. The 
‘catchphrase’ attached to this principle is: better safe than sorry.”). 
 76. Wireless Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 494 F. App’x 752 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 77. Id. at 753–54. 
 78. A district court judge recently ruled in favor of Berkeley, California when reviewing 
Berkeley’s similar required disclosures relating to cell phone radio-frequency. CTIA—The 
Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 2015 WL 5569072 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2015) (finding one 
section of the mandated disclosure preempted by federal law, but otherwise upholding the 
requirement against First Amendment challenges). See infra text accompanying notes 117–20. 
 79. Depending on the issue, those dissenters may be industry-funded.  
 80. Brief of Tobacco Control Legal Consortium et al., Supporting Appellees’ Petitions for 
Rehearing En Banc, Nat’l Ass’n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 2015 WL 5996680, at *4 (D.C. Cir.) 
(referencing the disclosure requirement in 49 U.S.C. § 32908 (2012)). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol50/iss1/3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016] Clarifying Standards for Compelled Commercial Speech 73 
 
 
taking any action to disclose proven or potential risks, essentially 
rendering them powerless. Instead, warnings should be invalidated 
only if the government lacks a factual basis for the required 
statements.  
B. What Is a Sufficient Government Interest Under Zauderer? 
A second unsettled issue is what government interests are 
sufficient to trigger the Zauderer test, as opposed to a more 
heightened standard of review. R.J. Reynolds suggested that Zauderer 
could only be invoked when the government was seeking to counter 
deception in the marketplace (which was the factual context 
presented in Zauderer). This part of R.J. Reynolds was expressly 
overruled by an en banc panel of the D.C. Circuit in American Meat 
Institute v. USDA, which upheld a requirement for country-of-origin 
labeling for meat.
81
 The D.C. Circuit held that “enabling customers to 
make informed choices based on characteristics of the products they 
wished to purchase” was an adequate governmental interest, even in 
the absence of consumer deception.
82
  
American Meat Institute’s conclusion is, in my view, correct.83 
Even though every Supreme Court case to apply Zauderer has done 
so in the context of preventing consumer deception,
84
 the Court has 
also suggested that compelled disclosures are preferable to 
restrictions on speech—even when consumer deception is not 
involved. In the Central Hudson case, for example, the Court struck 
down advertising restrictions that were intended to further the 
government’s interest in energy conservation by limiting advertising 
for electricity.
85
 The Court’s holding centered on its conclusion that 
 
 81. Am. Meat Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 760 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc). 
 82. Id. at 24–25. 
 83. Cf. CTIA—The Wireless Ass’n, 2015 WL 5569072, at *14 (“[I]t would make little 
sense to conclude that the government has greater power to regulate commercial speech in order 
to prevent deception than to protect public health and safety, a core function of the historic 
police powers of the state.”). 
 84. Id. at 42 (Brown, J., dissenting); see also Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 
U.S. 457, 491 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Zauderer carries no authority for a mandate 
unrelated to the interest in avoiding misleading or incomplete commercial messages.”). 
 85. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 558–60 
(1980). 
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the restrictions were more burdensome than necessary because the 
government could alternatively “require that the advertisements 
include information about the relative efficiency and expense of the 
offered service.”86 In other words, the Central Hudson framework 
relies heavily on the supposition that “more speech” (i.e., required 
disclosures) is preferable to restrictions on speech, whether or not the 
governmental interest at stake involves countering consumer 
deception.
87
 
In ruling that Zauderer is not limited to cases of combating 
deception, the D.C. Circuit followed the First and Second Circuits’ 
lead.
88
 Though not addressing the issue quite as directly, decisions in 
the Third and Seventh Circuits appear to go the other way.
89
 Most 
circuits, however, have not addressed this issue. Thus, although the 
trend appears to be towards a broader application of the Zauderer 
rule, the question is by no means settled. 
Assuming that Zauderer applies beyond cases of consumer 
deception, however, there is a subsidiary question of what type of 
interest the government must assert. Must it be a “substantial” 
 
 86. Id. at 570–71 (1980).  
 87. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (stating broadly 
that “[w]hen a State . . . requires the disclosure of beneficial consumer information, the purpose 
of its regulation is consistent with the reasons for according constitutional protection to 
commercial speech and therefore justifies less than strict review”).  
 88. Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding the 
government interest in “better inform[ing] consumers about the products they purchase” was 
sufficient); N.Y. State Rest. Ass'n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2009); Pharm. 
Care Mgt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 310 n.8 (1st Cir. 2005), accord Beeman v. Anthem 
Prescription Mgmt., LLC, 315 P.3d 71, 89 (2013) (“Laws requiring a commercial speaker to 
make purely factual disclosures related to its business affairs, whether to prevent deception or 
simply to promote informational transparency, have a ‘purpose . . . consistent with the reasons 
for according constitutional protection to commercial speech.’” (quoting 44 Liquormart, 517 
U.S. at 501)). The Sixth Circuit can arguably be added to this list as well. Citing the Second 
Circuit, it stated in Discount Tobacco that “Zauderer’s framework can apply even if the 
required disclosure's purpose is something other than or in addition to preventing consumer 
deception.” Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 556 (6th Cir. 
2012). Since the majority found that the interest in preventing consumer deception was 
implicated in the case, however, that statement could be characterized as dicta. 
 89. Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The Court 
has allowed states to require the inclusion of ‘purely factual and uncontroversial 
information . . . as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest 
in preventing deception of consumers.’” (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of 
Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985))); Dwyer v. Cappell, 762 F.3d 275, 283 (3d 
Cir. 2014). 
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interest?
90
 Is any legitimate interest sufficient, as would be the case if 
Zauderer were truly equivalent to rational basis review? Because the 
Supreme Court’s compelled commercial speech cases have all 
involved consumer deception, the nature of the government interest 
required outside of this context remains unclear.  
In International Diary Foods Association v. Amestoy, the Second 
Circuit struck down Vermont’s labeling requirement for dairy 
products produced using recombinant Bovine Somatotropin (rBST or 
rbST), ruling that “consumer curiosity alone is not a strong enough 
state interest” to trigger Zauderer review.91 It wrote:  
Although the Court is sympathetic to the Vermont consumers 
who wish to know which products may derive from rBST-
treated herds, their desire is insufficient to permit the State of 
Vermont to compel the dairy manufacturers to speak against 
their will. Were consumer interest alone sufficient, there is no 
end to the information that states could require manufacturers 
to disclose about their production methods. For instance, with 
respect to cattle, consumers might reasonably evince an 
interest in knowing which grains herds were fed, with which 
medicines they were treated, or the age at which they were 
slaughtered. Absent, however, some indication that this 
information bears on a reasonable concern for human health or 
safety or some other sufficiently substantial governmental 
concern, the manufacturers cannot be compelled to disclose 
it.
92
 
Though it did not use the term, Vermont had justified its law with 
respect to the “precautionary principle,”—the concern that rBST 
“may have long-term health effects that have not been sufficiently 
studied.”93 Like the Ninth Circuit in CTIA, the Second Circuit 
 
 90. See Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-CV-117, 2015 WL 1931142, at *35 (D. 
Vt. Apr. 27, 2015) (discussing this issue and concluding that “substantial interest” is not 
required by Zauderer). 
 91. Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 92. Id. (emphasis added).   
 93. Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 7-8, Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v. Amestoy, 1995 WL 
17049818 (C.A.2). 
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determined that the precautionary principle was not a “sufficiently 
substantial governmental concern.”  
The Second Circuit’s rejection of the precautionary principle as a 
substantial governmental interest is troubling for three reasons.
94
 
First, from a public health perspective, communities should be 
permitted to decide that they want to take proactive steps to avoid or 
mitigate potential harms, even if those harms are still speculative.
95
 
By the time potential harms (cancer, for example) materialize, they 
may well be impossible to undo. Although a disclosure requirement 
may cause economic harm in some cases, communities should be 
given leeway to balance those economic impacts against potential 
health concerns. Second, the unclear distinction between “satisfying 
consumer curiosity” and more “substantial” government interests 
potentially puts courts in the role of a scientific review committee, 
second-guessing legislative decisions by analyzing whether or not the 
science has accumulated to some unspecified level that justifies 
action. Judges—who are not trained to be sophisticated reviewers of 
scientific literature—are not well suited to this type of role. Third, so 
long as the mandated disclosure is factual and not misleading, it is 
hard to square the Second Circuit’s conclusion with the original 
purpose of the commercial speech doctrine. As noted above, that 
doctrine focuses on the interests of consumers in receiving 
information that might help to inform their decisions. The Amestoy 
decision exemplifies the problematic trend of courts shifting their 
focus away from the public’s interest in obtaining information and 
instead validating the “implausible claim of conscience” by 
manufacturers “compel[led] . . . to speak against their will.”96  
 
 94. The doctrinal basis underpinning this rule is unclear. Presumably it reflects an implicit 
assumption that the government must have a “substantial” government interest underlying the 
required disclosure in order for Zauderer to apply. 
 95. Robert Post, Compelled Commercial Speech, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 867, 895 (2015) (“If 
the citizens of Vermont distrust FDA conclusions that rBST is safe, and if they are willing to 
pay more for the identification of milk products made from rBST-treated cows than it costs to 
produce that identification, why should the Constitution prohibit Vermont from recognizing and 
responding to that distrust, especially because analogous suspicions of medical omniscience 
have in the past sometimes proved correct?”). 
 96. Richard J. Bonnie, The Impending Collision Between First Amendment Protection for 
Commercial Speech and the Public Health: The Case of Tobacco Control, 29 J.L. & POL. 599, 
617 (2014); Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 1996); Micah L. Berman, Commercial Speech 
Law and Tobacco Marketing: A Comparative Discussion of the United States and Canada, 39 
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The upcoming Second Circuit appeal from Grocery 
Manufacturers Association v. Sorrell (the genetic engineering 
disclosure case) will give the Second Circuit an opportunity to 
reconsider Amestoy and clarify the current state of law.
97
 The district 
court in Grocery Manufacturers suggested that so long as there is 
“scientific debate” about the health effects of genetic engineering, the 
state’s interest in requiring a disclosure is supported by more than the 
“mere appeasement of consumer curiosity” and Zauderer applies.98 
Although this effectively distinguishes Amestoy, in which the state 
essentially conceded that it did not yet have evidence of negative 
health effects from rBST, this rule would still limit the government’s 
use of the precautionary principle as a basis for policymaking. 
Instead, the Second Circuit should rule that Zauderer requires only a 
rational basis (not a “substantial interest”) for the government to 
require a factual disclosure.
99
 
C. What Happens if Zauderer Does Not Apply? 
A third major unanswered question is what the appropriate 
standard of review should be if a court determines that Zauderer does 
not apply. To date, most courts have turned to one of two options in 
this situation: (1) strict scrutiny, the highest standard of review;
100
 or 
 
AM. J.L. & MED. 218, 234 (2013) (“[T]he commercial speech doctrine in the United States 
started out by emphasizing the interests of consumers. Since that time, however, the focus of 
the courts has gradually shifted from the consumer to the speaker.”). 
 97. Amestoy has already been significantly limited by subsequent case law. See Nat’l Elec. 
Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 n.6 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that Amestoy is “expressly 
limited to cases in which a state disclosure requirement is supported by no interest other than 
the gratification of ‘consumer curiosity’”). 
 98. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, No. 5:14-CV-117, 2015 WL 1931142, at *33 (D. Vt. 
Apr. 27, 2015) (noting that Amestoy “has . . . been confined to its facts”); see also Nat’l Elec., 
272 F.3d at 115 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that “better inform[ing] consumers” was an interest that 
triggered Zauderer review even if “satisfying consumer curiosity” did not).  
 99. Note that even under a rational basis standard there must be some articulable reason 
why the government is requiring the disclaimer or warning. To take an example from Jennifer 
Keighley, “if the state were to compel all toys to have a label displaying the names of the 
individuals who designed the toy, with absolutely no rationale for why that information was of 
interest or value to consumers,” it is hard to see how such a requirement would survive even 
Zauderer’s lenient standard or review. Keighley, supra note 67, at 567. 
 100. See, e.g., Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(applying strict scrutiny after determining that mandated sticker on sexually explicit video 
games was “non-factual” and Zauderer therefore did not apply). 
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(2) the Central Hudson test, a form of intermediate scrutiny.
101
 In my 
view, the appropriate standard depends on why Zauderer was found 
to be inapplicable—but courts to date have not focused on this 
distinction.  
Strict scrutiny is appropriate only if the nature of the warning 
effectively transforms the issue from one involving commercial 
speech to one involving ideological or political speech, thereby 
triggering a higher standard of review. Even corporate actors engaged 
in commerce have a protected right not to “propound political 
messages with which they disagree.”102 This was the lesson of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. 
Public Utilities Commission of California, which overturned a 
California utility regulation requiring a power company to print 
political messages from a ratepayers’ advocacy organization in its 
newsletter.
103
 This was not a warning or disclaimer requirement to 
which the commercial speech doctrine should apply; it was a 
requirement for a utility to distribute political messages with which it 
disagreed. As Justice Marshall explained in concurrence, the state can 
“restrict or mandate [commercial] speech in order to prevent 
deception or otherwise protect the public’s health and welfare,” but it 
cannot compel one party to transmit a political message on behalf of 
another.
104
  
What might be deemed “political,” however, should not be 
overstated. Contrary to the D.C. Circuit’s recent conclusion in 
National Association of Manufacturers v. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, whether or not a product is “fairly traded” or whether or 
not a diamond is “conflict free” is not, in my view, an “ideological” 
or “political” statement, so long as those terms are adequately 
defined.
105
 That a company may vigorously disagree with how its 
 
 101. See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA., 696 F.3d 1205, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(concluding that Central Hudson set forth the appropriate standard). 
 102. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utilities Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 16 (1986). 
 103. Id. at 20. 
 104. Id. at 26 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 105. Nat’l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 13-5252, 2015 WL 5089667, at *8-9 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 
18, 2015) (holding, incorrectly in my view, that a requirement for companies to communicate in 
securities disclosures whether minerals are “conflict free” requires “ideological” speech). 
National Ass’n of Manufacturers likened the case to Entertainment Software Ass’n v. 
Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006) (striking down a requirement that “sexually explicit” 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol50/iss1/3
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product is characterized does not transform the issue into an 
ideological debate.
106
  
Subject to the narrow exception noted above, strict scrutiny is not 
the appropriate standard, because of the basic principle that 
commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment protection “less 
extensive than that afforded noncommercial speech.”107 And even 
within the world of commercial speech, mandated disclosures “trench 
much more narrowly on an advertiser's interests than do flat 
prohibitions on speech,”108 and are therefore appropriately subjected 
to a lesser standard of review. Applying strict scrutiny to compelled 
 
video games be labeled with a sticker reading “18”) and Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. 
Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 2009) (voiding a law that required “violent” video 
games to be labeled with an “18” sticker). Both of these cases are distinguishable for two 
reasons. First, they involve labeling on video games, a protected form of First Amendment 
communication (analogous to a book), which arguably requires a higher level of scrutiny. 
Secondly, both “sexually explicit” and “violent” were not clearly defined terms; the definitions 
in both cases referred to “community standards,” making it impossible for companies to 
determine with any certainty when the labels were required. It should also be noted that 
National Association of Manufacturers is an odd case in which to apply Zauderer, as the 
“conflict free” disclosure was required to appear on securities disclosure reports, not on product 
advertising or product labeling. Thus, one could argue that the case is about securities 
regulation, not “commercial speech” per se. See Post, supra note 95, at 872 (“[T]he disclosures 
at issue in NAM do not concern ‘speech proposing a commercial transaction’; they do not even 
concern advertisements.”); Nat’l Ass'n of Mfrs., 2015 WL 5089667, at *8 (Srinivasen, J., 
dissenting) (“Issuers of securities must make all sorts of disclosures about their products for the 
benefit of the investing public. No one thinks that garden-variety disclosure obligations of that 
ilk raise a significant First Amendment problem.”). 
 106. National Association of Manufacturers has been appealed to the D.C. Circuit. On 
appeal, the D.C. Circuit should look to the Supreme Court’s decision in Milavetz, Gallop & 
Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010). In Milavetz, the Court upheld a 
requirement that certain companies state in their advertisement that they are “debt relief 
agencies.” Id. Even though that term does not have any inherent meaning, and the company in 
question objected to being characterized as a “debt relief agency,” the Court rejected the 
company’s argument that the law violated Zauderer. Id. The same is true is National 
Association of Manufacturers; so long as the term in question is well-defined and provides 
useful information to consumers, companies have no constitutional right to wordsmith the 
government’s required disclosures. Nat’l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 13-5252, 2015 WL 
5089667. Instead, as in Milavetz, companies have the right to provide any additional 
information to consumers that they desire. 
 107. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 
637 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted); Rostron, supra note 34, at 572 (“Applying strict 
scrutiny to compelled disclosures that fall outside Zauderer . . . runs counter to the Supreme 
Court's frequent suggestion that disclosure requirements pose much less of a threat to First 
Amendment values than speech restrictions.”). 
 108. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651. 
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commercial disclosures, even as a backup standard to Zauderer, 
would flip these principles on their heads.
109
  
What standard should apply, however, is a more difficult question. 
As discussed in Part I.C, the Central Hudson standard—which 
applies to restrictions on commercial speech—can be applied to 
disclosure requirements only if twisted nearly beyond recognition. 
And as I have written elsewhere, even when applied as intended to 
restrictions on commercial speech, the Central Hudson test is 
internally inconsistent and requires courts to weigh incommensurable 
values (e.g., public health vs. consumer autonomy).
110
 If courts 
continue to narrow the definition of “factual and uncontroversial” and 
limit the governmental interests to which Zauderer applies, then it 
seems than the courts will also need to develop a new, intermediate 
standard of review that can replace Central Hudson as a backup 
standard of review.  
Such a backup standard may not be necessary, however. So long 
as a required disclosure is factually accurate and the government can 
identify a legitimate governmental interest, Zauderer should apply. If 
the required disclosure is factually false or misleading, or if the 
government cannot identify any legitimate governmental interest 
motivating the requirement, then the law should fail not only 
Zauderer, but also any other possible standard of review. Further, as 
discussed above, if a required warning is ideological or political in 
nature (or the warning/disclosure is being applied to speech that is 
not commercial advertising), strict scrutiny should apply. It is only 
because the courts have read the “factual and uncontroversial” and 
 
 109. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 376 (2002) (suggesting that 
instead of restricting advertising for compounded drugs, the government’s interest “could be 
satisfied by the far less restrictive alternative of requiring each compounded drug to be labeled 
with a warning that the drug had not undergone FDA testing and that its risks were unknown”); 
see also Rostron, supra note 34, at 572 (“[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly urged 
governments to consider mandating disclosures as a less burdensome alternative to regulating 
what advertisers can say.”).  
 110. Berman, supra note 53, at 508–09; cf. Rostron, supra note 34, at 531 (suggesting that 
the Supreme Court’s commercial speech doctrine is at odds with itself because of attempts to 
accommodate both “a pragmatic inclination to defer to reasonable legislative judgments,” and 
“an anti-paternalistic impulse that condemns governments for acting on fears that truthful 
information will encourage people to make bad choices”). 
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governmental interest requirements too narrowly that the question of 
a backup standard has become important. 
D. Does Identifying a Disclosure Requirement as “Government 
Speech” Matter? 
One final open question is whether unambiguously identifying a 
disclosure as “governmental speech” leads to an even more relaxed 
standard of review than Zauderer, as some have proposed. The 
Supreme Court stated in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association 
that “the Government’s own speech . . . is exempt from First 
Amendment scrutiny.”111 Although that case involved a compelled 
subsidy of government speech, not a required warning or disclosure, 
Stephen Sugarman has argued that the same principle should apply in 
the latter context. He writes:  
 
[If] what is being compelled is the carrying of government speech 
(and that should be made quite clear in the actual message if need 
be) . . . this sort of regulatory restriction does not involve the First 
Amendment at all so long as it does not preclude the product 
sellers from also conveying their message.
112
  
 
In his view, as long as cigarette warnings clearly state “Surgeon 
General’s Warning” or “FDA Warning,” they should be insulated 
from First Amendment review, because it is clear that the message 
being conveyed is the government’s, and not the manufacturer’s or 
retailer’s. 
At first blush, it may seem unreasonable to suggest that 
disclosures can be shielded from legal challenge simply by ensuring 
that the government is identified as the speaker. However, the logic 
underlying this argument is that as long as it is clear that the 
government is the speaker, the commercial actor is not being forced 
to speak against its will (because it is not the speaker at all). Just as 
the government could tax private businesses and use the proceeds to 
express its own views, compelled disclosures are another (and 
 
 111. Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005). 
 112. Sugarman, supra note 31, at 574. 
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perhaps more direct) way of requiring private parties to fund the 
distribution of the government’s message.113 And because the 
messages are clearly identified as government speech, if the public 
objects to a disclosure requirement it can seek redress through the 
political process.  
Despite the Supreme Court’s broad language, use of the 
government speech doctrine is not completely unrestrained. As 
discussed above, the government cannot commandeer private 
property to express a political or ideological message, and the 
message must be germane to the product at issue. Furthermore, even 
though the government is not forcing the private entity to “speak” a 
message, it is requiring it to carry the government’s message 
(presumably against its will). This imposes a real burden on the 
private entity that, in essence, has no way to refuse to carry the 
government’s message short of going out of business. Thus, there 
must be a limit to the amount of space the government can claim on a 
company’s product or advertising in order to covey its message.114 
Sugarman would use the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause as the 
doctrinal hook for imposing that limit.
115
 I would instead suggest that 
Central Hudson (or some similar intermediate standard or review) is 
appropriate to analyze the degree to which a compelled speech 
requirement limits a private entity’s ability to communicate its own 
message. But such a review would consider only the amount of space 
being taken up by the government’s message; it would not be a forum 
for second-guessing the content of the governmental message. A 
benefit of applying Central Hudson in this context is its sensitivity to 
the strength of the governmental interest at stake. Thus, very large 
mandated warnings on cigarette packages may be justified given the 
scope of the public health issue involved; for more minor public 
health concerns, such intrusive warnings may not be acceptable. 
 
 113. Id. at 575. 
 114. See Post, supra note 95, at 900 (“The function of the doctrine is to safeguard the 
circulation of information. If government compels disclosures that interrupt that circulation . . . 
by being so burdensome as to ‘chill’ the communication of information . . . it contradicts the 
essential goal of commercial speech doctrine.”). 
 115. Sugarman, supra note 31, at 574 (“[I]n my view, [the Fifth Amendment’s Takings 
Clause] is where this constitutional battle should be fought—and not with the First 
Amendment.”).  
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The courts have rarely analyzed compelled commercial 
disclosures through a “government speech” frame, largely because 
governmental defendants have not asked them to do so.
116
 
Governments should reconsider their unwillingness to pursue this line 
of argument. Approaching this cases from a “government speech” 
perspective could relieve the courts of the obligation to parse which 
messages are “factual and uncontroversial,” thereby providing a 
pathway around some of the knotty questions outlined above.  
In one of the few cases to directly discuss this issue, a district 
court judge in California recently upheld the City of Berkeley’s 
required point-of-sale disclosures relating to cell phone radio-
frequency.
117
 (Berkeley’s required disclosures were similar to, but 
somewhat distinct, from San Francisco’s.118) The judge in that case 
wrote that “there is a persuasive argument that, where . . . the 
compelled disclosure is that of clearly identified government speech, 
and not that of the private speaker, a standard even less exacting than 
that established in Zauderer should apply.”119 In such a case, the 
court concluded, “the Zauderer factual-and-uncontroversial 
requirement is not needed to minimize the intrusion upon the 
plaintiff’s first amendment interest,” and some version of rational 
 
 116. It does not appear that this argument was asserted by either the FDA in R.J. Reynolds 
or San Francisco in CTIA—The Wireless Ass’n New York City’s government did present this 
argument in 23-34 94th St. Grocery Corp. v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 685 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2012), 
a case involving mandated point-of-sale warnings for tobacco products, but the case was 
decided on preemption grounds, rather than First Amendment grounds. 
 117. CTIA—The Wireless Ass’n v. City of Berkeley, 2015 WL 5569072 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 
21, 2015). 
 118. Berkeley’s disclosure can either be provided to each customer who purchases a cell 
phone or posted at the point-of-sale. It reads in relevant part: 
The City of Berkeley requires that you be provided the following notice: 
To assure safety, the Federal Government requires that cell phones meet radio 
frequency (RF) exposure guidelines. If you carry or use your phone in a pants or shirt 
pocket or tucked into a bra when the phone is ON and connected to a wireless network, 
you may exceed the federal guidelines for exposure to RF radiation. This potential risk 
is greater for children. Refer to the instructions in your phone or user manual for 
information about how to use your phone safely. 
Id. at *1 (quoting Berkeley, Cal. Mun. Code § 9.96.030 (2015)). 
 119. Id. at *14. 
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basis review should apply instead.
120
 Notably, the judge in that case 
(Judge Edward Chen) is the same district court judge assigned to 
review San Francisco’s sugar-sweetened beverage warnings. 
III. LOOKING FORWARD: AMERICAN BEVERAGE ASSOCIATION V. SAN 
FRANCISCO 
The San Francisco sugar-sweetened beverage warnings lawsuit 
raises all four of the unsettled doctrinal issues discussed above: 
 Are the warnings “factual and uncontroversial”? 
Building on previous attempts to turn “factual” and 
“uncontroversial” into two separate requirements, the 
plaintiffs argue that these warnings are neither. 
Analogizing to CTIA, they assert that even if the warnings 
are technically factual (which they do not concede), they 
are misleading, and therefore “non-factual,” because they 
“convey . . . the misleading and controversial view that 
[sugar-sweetened beverages] are hazardous in any 
quantity and more hazardous to health than any other food 
or beverage about which the City requires no warning.”121 
Secondly, they argue that the warnings are “controversial” 
because they reflect only San Francisco’s “opinion” that 
sugar-sweetened beverages “have little or no value” and 
cannot be part of a healthy lifestyle.
122
  
 Is the city’s interest sufficient to trigger Zauderer 
review? The plaintiffs argue that Zauderer is inapplicable 
because the warning “does not cure or mitigate any 
consumer deception.”123 Thus, this case raises the same 
issue recently decided by the D.C. Circuit in American 
Meat Institute. 
 
 120. Id. at *15. The court ultimately decided that the disclosure requirement would 
withstand review under either an application of a “more rigorous rational basis review” or the 
Zauderer test. Id. at *16. 
 121. ABA Complaint, supra note 3, at 4. 
 122. Id. at 1. 
 123. Id. at 28. 
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 What happens if Zauderer does not apply? The 
plaintiffs assert that “at least heightened scrutiny” should 
apply in this case because the warnings are not “factual 
and uncontroversial” and do not counter consumer 
deception.
124
 They strongly suggest that strict scrutiny is 
the appropriate standard, but argue in the alternative that 
the warnings would also fail Central Hudson review. The 
city has not yet responded to this legal argument, will 
presumably argue that even if Zauderer is inapplicable, 
strict scrutiny is not the proper standard. 
 Are the warnings “government speech”? The warnings 
clearly state: “This is a message from the City and County 
of San Francisco.” Inclusion of that language suggests 
that San Francisco may be preparing to argue that the 
warnings constitute “government speech” and even 
Zauderer’s relatively lenient review is not necessary.  
In some respects, it seems that the American Beverage Association is 
fighting an uphill battle. The warnings involved do not involve 
images or graphics, and the textual warning is difficult to distinguish 
from longstanding cigarette warnings such as “SURGEON 
GENERAL’S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart 
Disease, Emphysema, and May Complicate Pregnancy.” Even though 
other products also cause these diseases and a few contrarian 
scientists might dispute the warning’s accuracy, the tobacco industry 
has never claimed that this warning is non-factual or controversial. 
Indeed, in R.J. Reynolds, the industry challenged only the mandated 
images, not the textual warnings.
125
 The fact that the American 
Beverage Association is willing to mount this challenge illustrates the 
degree to which courts have increasingly become open to challenges 
that might have seemed unimaginable in years past.  
At the same time however, San Francisco must consider whether 
this is the case in which it wants the courts to answer the doctrinal 
questions outlined above. Presumably in order to avoid raising 
 
 124. Id. at 7. 
 125. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (Rogers, J., 
dissenting).  
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Dormant Commerce Clause or federal preemption concerns, the 
warning requirement does not apply to advertisements in “any 
newspaper, magazine, periodical, advertisement circular or other 
publication, or on television, the internet or other electronic 
media.”126 Nor does it apply to the beverages themselves or to 
branded vehicles such as delivery trucks. For the most part, it will 
apply only to billboards and to advertisements in retail stores. 
Pointing out that a statute is not fully comprehensive is not grounds 
to invalidate it; a city should be permitted to act incrementally or 
incompletely, particularly when trying not to overstep the limits of its 
authority. Moreover, a city should not be faulted for acting modestly 
in order to stay within the limits of its constitutional authority. 
Nonetheless, one could question the likely effectiveness of the 
required warning, given that advertising resources can easily be 
channeled from billboards to other forms of advertising. Thus, if the 
court finds Zauderer to be inapplicable, it may well question whether 
the ordinance furthers the city’s interests to the “substantial degree” 
required by the Central Hudson test.  
Moreover, the “findings and purpose” section of San Francisco’s 
ordinance details voluminous evidence of the harms caused by sugar-
sweetened beverages, but it does not cite any evidence demonstrating 
the likely effectiveness of the proposed warning labels in reducing 
consumption (or even with respect to the intermediate goal of better 
informing consumer choice).
127
 Again, as a legal matter, such 
evidence should not be a prerequisite to action. Cities must have the 
flexibility to try creative and promising approaches that have not yet 
been tested, particularly as part of a multi-faceted approach to a 
complex problem. But the city might well prefer to litigate these 
issues in another test case in which is does have such evidence. As 
discussed in Part I, one should not assume that mandated warnings 
will necessarily have a positive public health impact. The city is no 
doubt aware that “bad facts make bad law.”  
Some legal experts have warned of a “collision course between 
public health and the First Amendment,” driven in part by conflicting 
 
 126. S.F., Cal., Ordinance 100-15 (2015). 
 127. Id. at 1–5. 
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interpretations of the compelled speech doctrine.
128
 Although R.J. 
Reynolds and other troubling recent cases hint as such a pending 
collision, a train wreck is not inevitable. The compelled speech 
doctrine can serve the interests of public health, particularly if courts 
look back to the Supreme Court’s original vision of the commercial 
speech doctrine in cases such as Virginia Pharmacy and Zauderer. 
As explained by the Supreme Court in those cases, compelled 
disclosures furthered the First Amendment interest in informing 
consumers, which was the primarily purpose of the doctrine. 
Accordingly, compelled speech was seen as a preferred form of 
governmental intervention, in contrast to restrictions on commercial 
speech. Although some recent lower court cases have strayed from 
this approach, the lack of recent Supreme Court precedent on point 
means that many lower courts retain broad flexibility in this area. The 
doctrine is still being developed.  
At the same time, however, public health advocates and 
government officials must be thoughtful and selective in using 
mandated disclosures as a tool. Disclosures and warnings have a 
mixed record in terms of effectiveness, and pushing too hard for 
warnings of questionable efficacy could undermine the standing of 
public health advocates with both the courts and the public.  
 
 128. Bonnie, supra note 96, at 600.  
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